Miguel Angel Martinez Carrasco

Home / Profesores / Miguel Angel Martinez Carrasco
Miguel Angel Martinez Carrasco

Miguel Angel Martinez Carrasco

ma.martinezc1 @uniandes.edu.co

Profesor Asistente

Oficina: SD_918A

Extensión: 2313

Facultad de Administración

Información básica
Cursos
Productos
Proyectos

Información básica

Cursos Recientes

  • 2021
    • LA GESTIÓN DE LO PÚBLICO

      Primer Periodo
      Licenciatura

      GERENCIA ESTRATÉGICA

      Primer Periodo
      Maestría

Productos Recientes

Martinez M.(2020).
24th Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE). Virtual
Evento
Martinez M.
10th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics (ASFEE)
Evento

Proyectos Recientes

  • 2018
    • Managerial Practices, Incentives and Productivity Gains

      Duración: 36 meses

      PR.3.2018.4987

      Input Allocation, Workforce Management and Productivity Spillovers: Evidence from Personnel Data: We present evidence on the existence of productivity spillovers at the workplace and its relation to input allocation.   Piece-rate incentive schemes and Heterogeneous Inputs across Workers: I analyze how the allocation of heterogeneous inputs across workers determine the response of the workers to different incentive schemes and as a consequence which role they play on the design of these incentives. Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations: Theory and Experimental Evidence: We investigate a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. Project Selection and Competitive Cheap Talk: An Experimental Study: We investigate how a decision maker selects among different projects that are recommended by different competitive experts, when these experts can lie about the quality of their projects depending the competition they face and the probability to receive more profitable projects in the future. The illusion of knowledge and The illusion of Hard-Working: We want to understand under what conditions will agents spend time on influential activities to the detriment of productivity of the organization and  what organizational and reputational characteristics facilitate and alleviate this type of behavior. In particular, when a manager want to give to her workers the illusion of knowledge or when a worker want to give to her manager the illusion of hard-working.

Cursos

  • 2021
    • LA GESTIÓN DE LO PÚBLICO

      Primer Periodo
      Licenciatura

      GERENCIA ESTRATÉGICA

      Primer Periodo
      Maestría
  • 2020
    • LA GESTIÓN DE LO PÚBLICO

      Primer Periodo
      Licenciatura

      LA GESTIÓN DE LO PÚBLICO

      Segundo Periodo
      Licenciatura
    • FUNDAM.ADMON Y GERENCIA (ADMI)

      Segundo Periodo
      Licenciatura

      ESTRATEGIA

      Segundo Periodo
      Licenciatura
  • 2019
    • LA GESTION DE LO PUBLICO

      Primer Periodo
      Licenciatura

      LA GESTION DE LO PUBLICO

      Segundo Periodo
      Licenciatura
    • ECONOMIA GERENCIAL

      Segundo Periodo
      Maestría
  • 2018
    • LA GESTION DE LO PUBLICO

      Segundo Periodo
      Licenciatura

      ECONOMIA GERENCIAL

      Segundo Periodo
      Maestría
  • 2017
    • FUNDAM.ADMON Y GERENCIA (ADMI)

      Segundo Periodo
      Licenciatura

      ECONOMIA GERENCIAL

      Segundo Periodo
      Maestría

Productos

Martinez M.(2020).
24th Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE). Virtual
Evento
Martinez M.
10th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics (ASFEE)
Evento
Martinez M.
23rd Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE)
Evento
Martinez M.
Bogotá Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Universidad de los Andes (Santiago de Chile, Chile), Universidad Nacional de Colombia .
Evento
Martinez M. (2019)
Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations
Otro
Martinez M.
European Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (EWEBE)
Evento
Martinez M. (2019)
Inputs, Asymmetric Information, and Incentives at the Workplace
Otro
Martinez M. (2019)
Project Selection and Competitive Cheap Talk: An Experimental Study
Otro
Martinez M. (2019)
Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning
Otro
Martinez M.
Annual Congress of the Peruvian Economic Association – Universidad de Piura
Evento
Martinez M.
Entrepreneurship and Private Enterprise Development (EPED) in Emerging Economies Workshop
Evento
Martinez M, Amodio F. (2018)
Input Allocation, Workforce Management and Productivity Spillovers: Evidence from Personnel Data
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (ISSN 0034-6527)
Artículo
Martinez M.
Universidad de los Andes (Economics), Universidad del Rosario, Universidad de Piura.
Evento
Martinez M.
1st Latin American Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (LAWEBESS).
Evento
Martinez M.
NBER Summer Institute - Productivity, Development & Entrepreneurship
Evento
Martinez M.
Universidad de los Andes, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Evento
Martinez M.
19th Colloquium on Personnel Economics: COPE2016 in Aachen University
Evento
Martinez M. (2016)
Behavioral Spillovers in Organizations A Selective Review
Experimental Economics (ISSN 1386-4157)
Artículo
Martinez M.
Workshop on Productivity, Entrepreneurship, and Development: September 2 - 3. McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
Evento
Martinez M.
Annual Congress of the Peruvian Economic Association - Universidad Pacífico
Evento
Martinez M.
IE Doctoral Consortium
Evento
Martinez M.
Latin American Economic Association Meeting - Santa Cruz, Bolivia
Evento
Martinez M.
NBER's Development Program Meeting/joint BREAD Conference, September 25 - 26, at NBER, 1050 Mass. Ave, Cambridge, MA, United States
Evento
Martinez M.
Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, London Business School.
Evento
Martinez M.
Universidad Javeriana, Universidad Católica de Chile, Universidad de Islas Baleares.
Evento
Martinez M.
Internal, Micro and Behavioral Economic Seminar
Evento
Martinez M.
SAEe, Palma de Mallorca
Evento
Martinez M.
1st Xmas Xperimental Workshop, University of Granada, Spain
Evento
Martinez M.
Barcelona Labor Economics Summer School, BGSE. Barcelona, Spain.
Evento
Martinez M.
Management and Behavioral Student Seminar
Evento
Martinez M.
North-American ESA conference, University of California - Santa Cruz, CA, United States.
Evento

Proyectos

  • 2018
    • Managerial Practices, Incentives and Productivity Gains

      Duración: 36 meses

      PR.3.2018.4987

      Input Allocation, Workforce Management and Productivity Spillovers: Evidence from Personnel Data: We present evidence on the existence of productivity spillovers at the workplace and its relation to input allocation.   Piece-rate incentive schemes and Heterogeneous Inputs across Workers: I analyze how the allocation of heterogeneous inputs across workers determine the response of the workers to different incentive schemes and as a consequence which role they play on the design of these incentives. Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations: Theory and Experimental Evidence: We investigate a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. Project Selection and Competitive Cheap Talk: An Experimental Study: We investigate how a decision maker selects among different projects that are recommended by different competitive experts, when these experts can lie about the quality of their projects depending the competition they face and the probability to receive more profitable projects in the future. The illusion of knowledge and The illusion of Hard-Working: We want to understand under what conditions will agents spend time on influential activities to the detriment of productivity of the organization and  what organizational and reputational characteristics facilitate and alleviate this type of behavior. In particular, when a manager want to give to her workers the illusion of knowledge or when a worker want to give to her manager the illusion of hard-working.