Centro de Aprendizaje Centrado en el Participante (CAP)

This case explores TecSalud’s response to COVID-19 between March 2020 and January 2021. TecSalud was the Healthcare System of the Instituto Tecnologico de Monterrey. The case focuses on hospital management, but it can also be used to teach crisis management, with potential applications in other industries. The narrative highlights the leaders’ challenges, critical decisions, and actions to address the pandemic, emphasizing the importance of considering key stakeholders to manage a crisis effectively. At the onset, TecSalud established a response team (the bunker) to address the pandemic.

The team identified four priorities: minimize disease transmission; protect patients, healthcare staff, employees, and students; keep the healthcare system functioning; and reduce morbidity and mortality. San Jose Hospital (HSJ) was designated as TecSalud’s exclusive COVID-19 treatment hospital.

The case focuses on two pivotal moments when difficult decisions had to be made. In May 2020, HSJ had been operating for eight weeks with an occupancy rate of 14%, resulting in significant financial losses. The bunker leader and TecSalud’s president, Guillermo Torre, decided with his team not to change course despite the risks and resistance from key stakeholders. In January 2021, at the peak of the second wave of infections in the state of Nuevo Leon, Torre, and the bunker members considered closing HSJ’s doors to new COVID-19 patients because demand had exceeded the hospital’s operational capacity; staffing was inadequate, personnel were exhausted and dissatisfied, and many resigned.

Representatives from intensive care, medical management, nursing, and HSJ operations argued that quality of care couldn’t be guaranteed, putting patients at risk. However, others argued that closing admissions to HSJ would deny care to patients with no other healthcare alternative.

The case concluded on January 25, 2021, when Torre and the response team met to decide the course of action for COVID-19 patients.

The Morales couple, Carlos and María, and Andrés Córdoba, shareholders of the twenty-year old Colombian mining company Carbostar, wanted to step down from the day-to-day management of the company in March 2018. To do so, they considered three options: selling the entire Company to Carbones de Panamá; partnering with Carbones Julius, which was willing to buy 45% of the shares as long as the founders participated in an aggressive expansion plan by increasing debt; or selling 60% of the shares to Maklan, a coal producer and supplier of heavy machinery in the industry, which could accept a generous dividend policy given its financial muscle.

As the majority shareholder (with 75% of the shares), Carlos Morales was not convinced about allowing third parties to manage the company he had founded. He secretly longed for one of his children to take over the company in the future. His wife María (Andrés’ sister) held 12.5% of the shares. Her interests lay in receiving an income from the business and she had no preconceived ideas on whether it was convenient to open up to third parties. Andrés Córdoba held the remai ning 12.5% of the shares. He was interested in creating a family office with the resources from the total or partial sale of Carbostar. As the financial expert of the group, he was responsible for advising his partners on their course of action.

Andrés’ challenge, which will be the task for students, is to find the option that best balances the disparate interests of his partners.

In March 2013, Alberto Silva, president of the newly appointed Board of Directors of Fabricato, one of Colombia’s oldest textile companies, met with representatives of the main shareholder groups in order to gauge their willingness to approve profound changes within the corporation and even inject new money, if necessary. The company was suffering from a major crisis caused by a stock market bubble generated around its share price, which resulted in the suspension of its stock market listing, the disqualification of a major group of shareholders, and the bankruptcy of Interbolsa, the brokerage company that financed the bubble.

With great effort, Silva was successful in obtaining, from the representatives of the main groups of shareholders, the commitment that they would vote in the Board of Directors in favor of hiring a new Executive President for the company, only if he were able to identify the path to follow: liquidate the company, restructure it with or without an injection of new money, or split it in two, one to keep the manufacturing assets and the other to develop the real estate business.

The student’s role is to assume Silva’s task and define the course of action to follow, making use of specific financial information about the company, an Excel simulation sheet of its share price and indicators, its history, the challenges of the industry, and the environment in Colombia for March 2013.

Although Tuplastibog is a fictitious name, it is based on a real company that was created in 2014 by Juan Carlos Ordoñez, using financing from his family’s business Agropecuaria de Occidente. Tuplastibog is losing money and faces going into liquidation unless urgent corrective measures are taken.

Juan Carlos needs to convince his father (Agropecuaria de Occidente’s controlling shareholder) to support his business, but first he needs to ensure that his projections are correct and that the accounting measures he plans to implement make sense and will help his company stay afloat in coming years.

To help students develop the case, an Excel spreadsheet is attached (Student_Excel.xlsx) A teacher version is also attached (Teacher_Excel.xlsx) to help understand the impact of the adjustments and financial statement projections.

This case is a roleplay simulation of the negotiations between the Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC-EP, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (henceforth FARC), leading up to and after the peace agreement of 2016. The peace agreement put an end to an armed conflict that lasted for more than 50 years and cost more than 200,000 lives.

The negotiations cover six Negotiation Topics: i. laying down arms & safety guarantees; ii. social integration of FARC; iii. justice & trial of war crimes; iv. political participation of FARC; v. rural reform; and vi. drug production. Students assume the roles of six participants in the negotiation, forming two delegations. One represents the Colombian Government and the other represents FARC.

The central theme of this case is corporate restructuring; in particular, its thematic unit is the process of financial stress within an organization. The courses and programs are for undergraduate courses such as Finance iii and Financial Strategy, with emphasis on financial analysis and modeling; for postgraduates such as the Masters in Finance in courses such as Financial Analysis and Corporate Finance; in the MBAs in the Financial Management course.

These last three courses at the graduate level, although they contemplate financial analysis and modeling within their dynamics, would focus on the evaluation of restructuring alternatives. Likewise, this case can be applied to different executive education programs related to crisis management in family businesses, financial issues in general, and crisis management. In general, the case provides a situation for management decision-making in the process of financial stress, supported by financial modeling tools.

Pepperoni Lovers is a negotiation exercise between two actors, buyer and seller, for a pizzeria chain and a premium producer of delicatessen meats. The owner of the pizzeria has a pressing need, as his regular supplier of pepperoni has recently gone out of business and the pizzeria has pepperoni stocked up for a little less than two weeks. For the owner of the Toscana Delicatessen, the negotiation offers the possibility of securing a buyer on a large scale.

This case allows students to negotiate six issues simultaneously and apply strategies for prioritizing issues in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement for both companies.

The Hospital de la Misericordia (HM), today HOMI Foundation, is a children’s hospital located in Bogotá (Colombia). It was founded by José Ignacio Barberi, Great Grandfather Barberi, in fulfillment of his wife’s last wish: to build a hospital for children. It officially opened its doors in 1906.

Great Grandfather Barberi conceived HM as a non-profit organization to be led by the members of the Barberi family. After the founder, three generations of Barberi family members have assumed the direction of HM: Rafael Barberi Cualla (Grandfather Barberi), Rafael Barberi Zamorano (Father Barberi), and Mauricio Barberi Abadía. Mauricio Barberi (appointed Director of HM in 1992) had to face a demand-based health system, under which HM was paid according to the amount of patients treated and there were not more subsidies from the State. Therefore, Mauricio had to begin a process of reengineering in HM, in order to become a competitive organization within the health market. HOMI was later impacted by the health system crisis, which delayed the payments it had to receive for its services.

The case is established in April of 2014, in the midst of the health sector crisis. Despite the situation, Mauricio Barberi decided to analyze two options to expand the services: to build a Pedatric Center to expand the facilities outward in the north of Bogotá, or to build a Childhood cancer center in the current location. The risky context that surrounds this decision begs for multiple questions about his persistence on this idea and the suitability of said decision for HOMI Foundation. Even more, although Mauricio does not consider to do nothing, as a third option, the case invites to consider it in the last step in the discussion of the case, because this option is also viable from a perspective that does not consider family issues. The answers to these questions lie in the power of the family firm’s legacy and entrepreneurial legacy, which is the focus of the case.

This case explores how crisis management planning is a fundamental part of designing a communication plan. The case narrates a social media storm that affected Masglo, Colombia’s bestknown and market-leading brand of nail polish. One of the company’s growth strategies was to follow the global tendency of giving its products innovative and suggestive names to make them memorable and easily recognizable. The brand used names like Golosa (Rapacious, 2011), Fufurufua (Whore, 2012), Zángana (Hussy, 2013), Buscona (Slut, 2015) and Ñera (Street Girl, 2015).

These labels are understood by Colombians as being at the limit of socially accepted female behavior, due to their sexual, suggestive and vulgar connotations. A Masglo fan page user questioned this strategy and inspired a wave of criticism and comments that went beyond the confines of social media. This case tells the origin story of these names, and explores the reaction to the fan page post, and it’s impact in the media. The situation provides context for discussion on how to develop a media crisis management plan.

Alexandra Camacho, Vice President of Credit Risk at the Multilateral Development Agency (MDA), faces the challenge of preparing in a short time a report that links the results of CSR management to the financial performance of Banco W. Demonstrating the link between finance and CSR has been established as an essential requirement given the critical position of Ernesto Rivera, Vice President of Sustainable Development, as a prerequisite to the approval of a guarantee being requested by Banco W.

The approval of this guarantee will allow Alexandra to complete the goals required of her unit, to attend to the special request of the President of MDA to give a prompt response to the bank and to open a new niche of clients. In the role of Alexandra Camacho, the students will take on the challenge of developing the Value Footprint or Fourth Financial Statement. It will enable them to relate the results of the financial management and the CSR of Banco W and thus be able to support the recommendation of the endorsement requested by Banco W.

This case uses public information of Banco W for didactic purposes, and all characters and situations presented are the product of fiction.

The case describes the journey of Ecoflora until 2020. In 2004, the company began to focus on innovation after one of its principal customers became a direct competitor, and produced own-brand products for a niche market. Ecoflora was able to become a biotechnology innovator in an emerging country (Colombia) by intelligently leveraging the region’s science and technology ecosystem, and by systematizing its R&D+I process.

Althoug this hybrid company created an inclusive supply chain, management quickly found out that company commitment to this supply chain would be conditioned by the need to expand output and meet increasing demand. Ecoflora’s success would depend on increasing international sales-not only to capture financial value, but also to catalyze positive social and environmental change.

Propais is a non-profit organization founded in 1994 in Bogota by the public and private sectors and supported by 76 partner organizations. In October 2018, Maria Lucia Castrillon, general manager of Propais, was concerned about the future of the micro-franchising project (MFP) that had been active since 2012. The MFP was core to Propaís’s mission of promoting «the development of micro and small businesses through strategic work, carried out jointly by public and private agents».

It promoted the creation of 70 new enterprises that generated 350 direct jobs and produced over USD 1 million in annual sales. The IDB-MIF, a co-financer of the project with a total investment of USD 2,540,150, had recently announced its decision to withdraw in May 2019, generating great uncertainty about future feasibility. Propais had invested time and money to become a reference point in franchise structuring. Without MFP support both franchisers and franchisees could lose the opportunity to do business, and the potential would be lost to create five direct jobs at each franchise.

Two options to keep the project going were: 1. Propaís could continue to manage the project but would need new financial resources from donors and investors, and 2. Propais could transfer its knowledge and processes to its partners (such as the Ministry of Commerce, Medellin Chamber of Commerce, private foundations or companies) so that they could in turn scale up the micro-franchise model. However, both options implied a long negotiation process and IDB-MIF support would end in just seven months. Moreover, Propais did not have enough resources to support the project alone during a transition.

Since her appointment as General Manager of The National Symphony Orchestra of Colombia, Claudia Franco focused on its commercial management. She managed to increase the revenue of the Orchestra through an ambitious commercial agenda that involved concerts with famous artists, chamber concerts, recordings and movie soundtracks. Claudia counted on the musician’s commitment and disposition to accomplish all the activities aimed at positioning the Orchestra in Colombia and abroad, while acknowledging they did not have an exclusivity contract. In fact, many of them were hired on a temporary basis and the majority had side jobs to complement their earnings.

Given the budget cuts announced by the government at the time, Mariana -the Minister of Culture- requested the implementation of a performance management system for the Orchestra. She considered performance information crucial to make decisions regarding musicians’ hiring and salary. Cost containment and organizational efficiency were her main priorities. Musicians, on the other hand, were reluctant to commit to key performance indicators, as they believed that difficult auditions, rehearsals, and live concerts were enough evidence of their artistic performance and commitment to the National Symphony Orchestra.

Claudia was in the middle of a struggle: she knew that 80% of the Orchestra’s budget came from the Ministry, and not complying with the Ministry’s demands could imply a significant reduction of the budget allocation. On the other hand, she needed musicians on board to execute her agenda. What alternatives did she have, and how did she deal with the stakeholders’ conflicting demands?

Arbusta was a social enterprise in the ICT sector, recognized for both the quality of its services and for employing disadvantaged youth. It had more than 300 employees at its headquarters in Buenos Aires and in its offices in Rosario, Montevideo and Medellín. By 2020, after six years of building Arbusta, each of its three founders was focusing on an important issue for the organization: i.e., close attention to customer relations, develop the talent of each person at Arbusta, and find better ways to structure Arbusta as a space where social and economic aspects coexisted.

Through their testimonies and others from collaborators and clients, the case describes the evolution of this social enterprise. The dilemma faced by the three founders of Arbusta was about how to grow: should Arbusta specialize in a basic service such as testing or should it expand its range of services to include the development of the company’s human talent?

The Alcagüete case is an example of a market-focused social initiative (B Corporation) that encountered serious doubts regarding its mission while it was considering an expansion proposal that would allow it to grow exponentially in record time.

Alcagüete produced and sold healthy snacks. A fundamental pillar of the business was its social value proposition of combating childhood malnutrition. This was reflected in the brand and its 1×1 cause-related marketing strategy under which for each product sold, a contribution was made to a social organization addressing childhood malnutrition in Colombia, becoming a mainstay of its positioning and differentiation strategy.

A progressive growth strategy had been working, but a more significant scale-up was needed the following year. One of the company’s strategic partners had offered to sell products at hard-discount stores, but at what cost? And if they didn’t, what other growth options were available?

The case describes how FAVAC emerged and consolidated. During the Foundation’s first 15 years, the care of elderly people – many of them with physical and mental disabilities, some living on the streets, displaced by violence or abandoned by their families – was possible with financial support from various sources: state entities, international friends, a French association, local companies, institutional events and self-sustaining profitable projects.

In mid-2008, Albeiro received the feasibility study for the construction of a facility for senior citizens belonging to the wealthiest families of Bucaramangan society. This project would finance up to 30% of the care costs of the vulnerable elderly people to whom Albeiro had dedicated his life. The decision to either create the second center to serve the elite or instead remain focused on serving the vulnerable elderly people and consolidating the portfolio of funding sources concludes the first part of the teaching case.

Mr. Manuel Aristizábal was the founder of San Basilio, a restaurant that began operations in 2001. Angelina, Manuel’s wife, started to work at the family firm on trial. Very soon, however, her organisational and managerial capacities meant that she became completely involved in the business. The business’ growth was very conservative when Manuel and his wife were in charge. When Martín (their son) returned from studying abroad, he proposed new challenges for the family firm. Martín set up a catering service for San Basilio, led the opening of an additional branch, and began a successful ice cream business. The first two opportunities were leveraged in San Basilio, his parents’ business; the new branch and the earnings from the catering service were important economic benefits just for him. Martín is the sole owner of the ice cream business.

However, San Basilio’s growth started to exceed its operational capacity, and, according to Angelina and Anette (their daughter), its financial performance was at risk. Angelina and Anette were interested in slow growth for the business and in maintaining the family ties, which had weakened due to the Martín’s entrepreneurial activities. Martín’s proposal to pass the catering service to San Basilio was the straw that broke the camel’s back. He had been running it on his own and now wanted his parents to assume control of the whole operation and to give him a commission for the business whose original idea and current performance were the result of Martin’s management.

The case documents the evolution of Dress Your Home (DYH) into a profitable line of business for Colcerámica. This was a great achievement since, outside of micro-finance businesses, there were very few large companies that had created successful initiatives with the base of the socio-economic pyramid. DYH initially sought to generate positive social effects through a variety of ways.

A decade later, the social effects were focused on two proposals: one, on a small scale, to generate labor inclusion for low-income citizens as sales promoters; the other, on a larger scale, to improve the living conditions of thousands of households through their home improvement products. This is the second pedagogical case about the DYH experience. The first one focused on lessons about the logistics needed to reach the «last mile» (case SKS-116 in the HBP case collection).

Asocomún and Peacebuilders are two organizations that have made an oral and informal agreement to present a joint proposal to the European Union (henceforth the EU) about coexistence incubators in schools. Peacebuilders has been working on the technical and economic proposal for the last month and despite having had several meetings with Asocomún, they never defined how to distribute the budget between the two organizations.

Both organizations worked on the premise that it was very important to carry out the project due to its social scope and therefore the economic issues became secondary, assuming, moreover, that it would be easy to reach an agreement. This, however, was not the case.

The Austrian Republic School, an elementary public school in Chile, faced a severe crisis. Despite its management team and faculty’s effort, the school’s absenteeism and dropout rates kept rising. The solutions tried had failed to engage students and to secure their families’ support. The absenteeism issue proved particularly acute for the vulnerable population served by this school and had called the attention of Chile’s Education Ministry.

This scenario was compounded by a financial distress: the school lacked the necessary resources to provide the additional support required by this population, such as psychological and social counseling or family engagement activities.Against such a complex backdrop, Luis Lacourt, the school’s principal, caught a glimpse of a light at the end of the tunnel: a means to mitigate this problem. Chile’s SEP Act offered grants to schools working with «priority» students coming from underprivileged social and financial backgrounds.

Yet, access to these subsidies depended on good attendance rates. It was a catch-22-like problem: the SEP Act would enable the school to access the resources required to work on its problems, but the school would not qualify for this funding if it didn’t show improvements in its key metrics. How should the school go about it? What could it do to engage families in order to lower dropout and absenteeism rate.

Hamburguesas El Corral is a Colombian hamburger fast food chain founded in 1983. From the beginning, Hamburguesas El Corral was recognized as a traditional Colombian brand, positioning itself with the motto «the original recipe» as a provider with focus on fresh and highest quality products. The case allows students to examine the service encounter design of Hamburguesas El Corral and to compare it with McDonald’s, which entered the Colombian market in 1995 and took over market leadership from Hamburguesas El Corral in 2012.

The case furthermore tackles the trend towards delivery services in the fast food sector, addressing the specific service encounter design components of this delivery mode as well as its potential benefits and risks within the context of a changing competitive environment. The case finally asks students to analyze potential responses of El Corral’s management to regain market share and market leadership, leading to the following question: Should El Corral hold firm to its traditional «no-delivery-service» policy or should it adapt to a major market trend and create a new brand, «El Corral Home», as a 100% home-delivery chain?

James Reid, the newly appointed GM of Troubled Spain, has been given a mandate by the CEO of Troubled Inc. to turn the subsidiary around within six months. Troubled Spain has experienced several years of poor performance that cannot be explained by either sluggish demand or lagging technology. The case provides information about interviews that James had with several employees, describing the role of the employee and giving insights into the issues that they see the company facing. These interviews are complemented by three charts prepared by consultants that James hired to conduct an internal audit of collaboration, communication and informal leadership in the organization.

James needs to transform the organization within six months; however, this implies changing relationships that have been developed over decades and clarifying roles and boundaries that have been blurred over many years. The case challenges students to take James’ position and identify the issues of Troubled Spain to develop an action plan in order to address the challenges facing the company. James needs to address: 1) issues concerning Troubled Spain’s formal structure, 2) issues regarding its informal structure, including leadership issues, and 3) issues stemming from the combination of both formal and informal features. Case B provides information about what happened next and may be distributed at the end of the session.

This case study discusses Magic: the Gathering (Magic), a collectible card game that is owned by Wizards of the Coast (Wizards), a subsidiary of Hasbro. In particular, it focuses on how Wizards manages the Magic player community and its need to learn how to respond to various kinds of consumer-generated content (CGC) created by players. Magic is a collectible card game that has seen tremendous growth since its inception in 1993. By 2015 it had 20 million players worldwide and generated annual revenue of $200 million USD. Its primary revenue stream comes from selling sealed packs of Magic cards, and it releases a new set every three months. There are various types of packs available; each contains about 15 cards. Players must use these cards to construct a 60-card deck, which they use to play head-to-head against an opponent’s deck.

The case study describes in detail how Wizards interacts with its community. Predominantly, the company uses social media to release news, gather feedback, and respond to issues. Particularly noteworthy are how Wizards uses Spoiler Season to increase the anticipation for new card sets, and Friday Night Magic, casual tournaments at local game stores to connect players with vendors. The player community is very diverse, both in terms of age (roughly from 12 to 45 years old) and level of engagement (from occasional/casual to tournament-level, competitive players). In addition, Magic players are drawn to the game for a variety of reasons, which is illustrated by the three player types (or personas) Timmy, Johnny and Spike. This diversity is important for Wizards to keep in mind when the company develops new products, promotes its products, organizes events, and interacts with the community.

The case describes the service system design of Transmilenio, Bogotá’s award-winning mass transit system, in the context of violent riots that erupted on March 9, 2012. From the inception of operations in December 2000, Transmilenio, designed as a bus rapid transit system (BRT), was perceived as a success story. While initially complementing the traditional multi-actor bus system on a few routes, Transmilenio is expected to become Bogotá’s dominant mass transportation system in the future. Despite a successful record, on March 9, 2012, a fierce protest against the Transmilenio system shocked the city of Bogotá. This protest turned into violent actions of unprecedented magnitude in several parts of the city, causing approximately US$500,000 in damages, 11 injured and dozens arrested.

In the afternoon of March 9, 2012, Mateo Rodríguez, a Transmilenio’s member of the board of director, was cited to an extraordinary board meeting in the next morning. It would have the main objectives of analyzing the recent events and making the decisions that Transmilenio was demanding at that moment, to face the riots. Preparing the meeting and set a position imply for Mr. Rodriguez an in-depth analysis of Transmilenio system, Transmilenio SA, and also understand the nature of BRT systems and their expected paths to create value in a context such as Colombia. Whatever Mr. Rodríguez decides, his recommendations can affect not only the continuity of operations in the coming days but also the design of this award-winning service system.

Founded in 2009 by Tyler Gage and Dan MacCombie, Runa was the result of their experience living with local communities. After six years of operation, Runa had built new markets for teas and energy drinks based on guayusa. Their marketing efforts in the United States had put their products in over 5,800 stores and had doubled their revenues between 2014 and 2015. Tyler and Dan decided to shape their start-up on the principles of fair trade and sustainable business models, with the aim of improving the livelihoods of the Kichwa and contributing to the development and sustainability of the guayusa value chain.

Their business had a commercial for-profit branch led by Runa LLC in the United States and Runatarpuna Exportadora S.A. in Ecuador. Fundación Runa in Ecuador and the Runa Foundation in the United States constituted Runa’s nonprofit branch. The RG supported the development of local economic capacity by offering producers a 15% premium on all purchased guayusa. This premium was placed in a Fair Trade Social Premium Fund to be administered by the farmer associations. RG increased the incomes and favored the inclusion of small indigenous producers in the guayusa value chain. The foundations focused on research, improvement in the farmers’ productive activities and community development, and on the promotion of fair public policies, while the for-profit companies focused on the production, marketing, and sales of the final products for the United States market. From the perspective of RG founders, 2017 would be critical to demonstrate that their business model could be sustainable, and that they could keep on growing as a business while benefiting the farmers and protecting the environment.

This teaching case focuses on the challenges and dilemmas of modeling a sustainable business that is founded not only on the pursuit of the entrepreneurial venture’s economic consolidation and growth, but also on a multiple stakeholders’ view of value creation.

Alquería was founded by Professor Jorge Cavelier and his son Enrique Cavelier with the motto, «A bottle of milk is a bottle of health.» From Alquería’s inception, the Cavaliers looked for ways to innovate on their products and to substantially improve the quality of the milk they offered to their customers, introducing new packaging formats and production techniques.

In 1992, Carlos Enrique Cavelier took over at Alquería’s helm. His studies in Sociology, Anthropology and Public Administration abroad as well as his years in public service in Colombian politics prepared him to become a business leader who cared not only about his family business’ prosperity but also about the communities surrounding the company. During his tenure, Cavelier has shown a special commitment to his suppliers -small dairy farmers- helping them with training programs on nutrition and more updated, efficient and quality-enhancing production techniques. He has also played a key role in his organization’s communication and identity building efforts, as well as a strong network and partnership driver, engaging Alquería stakeholders.

Headed by Cavelier, Alquería has taken a leading role in significant national debates, such as the ones on corporate responsibility in post-conflict scenarios, on free trade treaty challenges, and on Colombia’s competitiveness issues, among others. The company’s current management has received national and international awards. By 2013, Alquería ranked among Colombia’s largest dairy producers, following Colanta S.A. and Alpina S.A.

ESSA is a Colombian electricity utility company. Its origins date back to the late nineteenth century in the Department of Santander. Its history and evolution comprise various stages. After a first State-owned phase managed by Colombian government, the regional business group Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM for its acronym in Spanish) acquired ESSA. EPM was characterized by a sound and successful corporate governance model. ESSA has always showed a deep-rooted sense of attachment to its local community (Santander), has therefore played an influential role and has had major engagement in the development of the Department of Santander. Its acquisition by a group from another Colombian region, Antioquia, confronts ESSA with a series of corporate governance dilemmas, visibly affecting daily management.

The case offers the possibility of analyzing and discussing the decisions a general manager must make and the risks he must run when his personal criterion diverges from those of majority shareholders and the perceived interests of his stakeholders (critical dimension in a public utility company). Carlos Alberto Gómez, General Manager at ESSA (the leading character in this case), must analyze the outcome of a bidding process methodology he believes in, yet does not have the approval and full support from the parent company, EPM. He will also need to assess how to obtain financial support from ESSA to sustain and recover a regional icon: the Santander Theatre. The decision is not autonomous, as he must seek the approval from its parent headquarter located in a different department.

This case illustrates some of the complexities involved in teaching in a participant-centered learning process. Specifically, it focuses on the learning process components as well as the tensions and barriers that hinder teaching practice changes. It describes an actual teaching experience with a couple of former Colombian combatants -one from a paramilitary group and another one from a guerrilla army- who are invited to an undergraduate public management course to share their life experiences with students in an innovative attempt by the teacher to bring the reality of this conflict closer to class participants.

Students’ reactions in class and their subsequent analysis build up a tense atmosphere that drives the professor to question her own teaching methods. On account of the specific issue addressed by this case -students’ attitude towards Colombia’s armed conflict as a result of their social status- this case may be used to discuss the impending challenges faced by a society after a conflict like the one experienced by Colombia.

The Yasuní-ITT (Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini) Trust Fund was established to receive contributions from donors supporting Ecuador’s historical decision to permanently relinquish the extraction of crude from the ITT oil block, a field located at the Ecuadorean Amazonia’s Yasuní National Park (YNP) that was estimated to hold a reserve of 846 million barrels of oil. Contributions would be used to fund renewable energy projects and sustainable development investments, such as deforestation reduction and ecosystem preservation in Ecuador’s Amazon region. Thus, appealing to a global spirit of shared responsibility, President Rafael Correa’s government requested that the international community compensated Ecuador with US$ 3.6 billion (paid over a 13-year period) to cover half of the revenues the country would fail to receive as a result of its decision to relinquish oil extraction at ITT.

International contributions would be viewed as a compensation for Ecuadoreans’ sacrifice, which would bring significant public benefits for the entire planet, including a less contaminated atmosphere. This case consists of three parts and has been designed for a two-session discussion. Sections A and B may be discussed during a first 90-minute class and require no previous preparation from students. These sections focus on encouraging class participants to make a critical analysis of the type and amount of information necessary to make a decision. Section C will be discussed in a second 90-minute session and requires students to prepare this case beforehand, making the necessary financial calculations for this analysis. Part A explores the period before November 24, 2009, when President Correa and UNDP announce the terms for the draft agreement for Yasuní-ITT’s Trust Fund.

Two Colombian entrepreneurs started a restaurant that was very similar to an already existing franchise. Since the case describes the similarity -even in the details- between the business model formulated by these couple of graduates from a private university in Bogotá and a restaurant created in the Netherlands, which already offered franchises in Colombia, it paves the way to discussing dilemmas associated with startups and our role as consumers in society.

To what extent is it legitimate to imitate a business model? What potential benefits can be drawn from imitating a business model? In what circumstances does imitation lead to win-win scenarios?

Tin Mining, Inc. was a company located in a developing country called Boldavia mainly dedicated to tin exploitation and production. During its initial thirty-three years of operation (1971-2004), it developed three organizational capabilities (technical, productive, and trust building). The case illustrates three typical characteristics of capabilities: effective solution to complex problems, regular and successful practice, and reliability and development over time.

Additionally, it also illustrates the organizational capabilities paradox which emerges during the 2004-2008 period and three of its causes: path dependency (lock in), structural inertia, and the absence of a capability dynamization function. In 2009, Tin Mining, Inc. faced the need to reshape its organizational capabilities, and the arrival of a new president to the company was a propitious moment to analyze this option.

This case describes how Codensa, an electricity company in Bogotá and Cundinamarca (Colombia), developed an easy-access consumer credit business model for low-income populations leveraged by the cost structure of its core business. Codensa offered consumer credit to low income populations through the Codensa Hogar business unit, by linking together a value chain of large retailers and manufacturers of household appliances. Codensa entered into this business as part of its commercial branding strategy, contributing its billing structure as credit collection instrument. During the first five years of the program, 95% of the 450,000 people who took out one or more loans belonged to the lower economic strata, and were between 25 and 45 years old. Sixty-six percent of Codensa users were people who did not participate in the formal banking system.

After obtaining a credit history with Codensa, 45% of this population gained access to other financial services. Over the course of five years, Codensa Hogar surpassed the US$250 million mark in its credit portfolio, issuing loans up to three times the salary of electric bill holders. Nearly 50% of clients asked for new credit upon completing their payments.

In 2006, the unusual growth rates of Codensa Hogar aroused concern among shareholders. If it were to sustain this rate, the surplus from the electric energy business would not be enough. Growth funds should be sought from within the company or from an outside source. However, members of the financial division disagreed. They argued that the funding cost that Codensa had to pay the electricity company should include an analysis of the risks assumed by the company. The difference between the commercial and financial visions posed a variety of challenges for general management.

AMICHOCÓ Foundation was a private non-profit organization operating since 1996 in the Colombian department of Chocó, one of the poorest in the country and characterized by being largely inhabited by ethnic minorities of African origin and enjoying one of the highest levels of biodiversity in the world. The Foundation implemented productive projects that help improve the living conditions in communities within a framework of social and environmental sustainability. In this line, in 2000, the Foundation encouraged the creation of Oro Verde Corporation (hereinafter, OVC), a cross-sector alliance involving, in addition to AMICHOCÓ, three local social organizations. OVC developed the Green Gold program that considered conventional small- scale mining as a productive alternative that could be integrated to specific market niches.

The case depicts the overall situation of Chocó department and the importance of the mining industry to its economy. It also describes OVC’s inception and the role played by AMICHOCÓ in its creation, and provides a detailed account of the Green Gold program, with an emphasis on its value proposition: a business model that articulated traditional gold production in Chocó with green international markets. In addition, it recounts the concerns expressed by community representatives with regard to the model’s efficiency and its capacity to create economic value.

These concerns raised the possibility of building alliances with medium-scale private mechanized mining companies in order to enhance the model’s economic impact.

The case describes the ability of Hocol to understand and transform multiple contextual forces, adverse and convergent, to develop internal capacities and to apply its business competencies to achieve positive results in the economic, social and environmental realms. Hocol designed a business model under the following principle: «the success of the company is founded on the success of the people and groups that surround it.» While the company claimed «not to have a model,» it was clear that it was one of learning, experimentation and incremental and permanent adaptation to the demands of its external context.

The conception of a business model with these characteristics redirected the development of Hocol´s activities, in particular the work of the Government and Community Affairs and Industrial Protection team, and shaped the activities of the Foundation wherever it operated. Hocol maintained that to achieve better economic and social results it needed to understand and manage a variety of pressures that stemmed from the environment in which it worked.

At the same time, it needed to build internal resources and abilities that would allow it to convert threats into opportunities and to respond to the expectations of shareholders, sub-contractors, surrounding communities and other stakeholders. In sum, Hocol sought to understand the evolution of needs in the society of which it was a part and to help satisfy these needs through strengthening community-based organizations and governmental institutions.

In 2006, Alpina had processing facilities in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela and its products were distributed in 34 countries. With annual sales of nearly $275 million, it was one of the largest private dairy companies in the Andean region. Alpina’s social initiatives began early in the organization’s history.

The founders of the company and the families that were involved in its operations created a work environment in which the needs of stakeholders were a priority. As the company grew, there were changes in its ownership structure. Yet, in 2006, the owners of Alpina, Inc. were still a relatively small number of family investors. With growth there was also an expansion of social initiatives, which were carried out in different areas. Between 2002 and 2006, the Human Resources Department initiated a series of actions to consolidate social responsibility (SR) activities and to achieve greater impact. These efforts fell short when, in 2006, upon implementing a new corporate model, the Executive Committee began to question the purpose and scope of these social activities.

The case puts the students in the place of Juan Pablo Fernández who, after three years in the company, was named Vice-President of Marketing. The Executive Committee gave his office the task of preparing a proposal to increase Alpina’s social impact and established a limit on the amount of resources available for these activities.

The Association for the Wellbeing of the Colombian Family, Profamilia, is a private, nonprofit organization founded in September 1965 by Dr. Fernando Tamayo Ogliastri with the objective of distributing family planning to low income families. Profamilia was a pioneer in its field; its impact increased as it became both organizationally and administratively stronger, and as its focus on family planning was expanded to include sexual and reproductive health.

After four decades of operation, Profamilia continued to offer services to attend to the sexual and reproductive health of Colombians. By mid-2003, Profamilia, spurred by changes in the health sector in Colombia with the implementation of Law 100 of 1993, needed to redefine its strategy. The health sector reform encouraged the entry of other organizations that competed directly with Profamilia, resulting in the organization’s loss of its relative monopoly as a provider of reproductive health services and family planning products.

The most visible consequence was the reduction of its participation in the market. Changes in the sector gave impulse to the process of strategic redefinition to face critical tradeoffs between social and economic value generation.

The Twenty-First Century Leaders Program was launched by a group of business leaders from the Presidential Forum of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota. Ten business leaders and private schools agreed on a common objective: to improve the quality of education in Colombia.

Today, 187 public and private schools have allied with 109 businesses in nine cities to strengthen schools as organizations and to benefit more than 100,000 children. The project helps schools to adopt better administrative practices and, since 2001, it has led national forums on the topics of quality in school administration to highlight the experience of schools that have experienced the greatest progress. Besides the topics related to quality, the project is also directed toward policy planning and implementation. Highlights the role played by Meals de Colombia, a frozen foods manufacturer and retailer that has led the program since its beginning.

Indupalma was managed as a plantation during its first 30 years. Labor cooperatives emerged as a response to a financial and governance crisis that led Indupalma to the brink of bankruptcy at the beginning of the 1990s. Workers and peasants formed associations to create autonomous business units (such as cooperatives, microenterprises, and associations), which sold their services to Indupalma.

The company invested a great deal of resources in technical and administrative training and in human resource development for associates. The performance of workers improved, and the financial viability of the company was regained. Today, cooperatives face multiple social and economic challenges; the role of Indupalma in facing these challenges (intervention, paternalism, empowerment, or indifference) will put to the test the solidity and true impact of the development process.

Cerámicas de Costaragua (CC) began producing ceramic tile in 1953. The founders were interested in forming a vertically integrated chain. During the 1990s, CC suffered the consequences of policies that liberalized the economy and, amidst a decline in sales, it decided to enter into a new unexplored market in the ceramic sector: low-income consumers.

Lack of knowledge about the behavior of low-income consumers was a challenge for CC. Therefore, it sought the support of a social leader who knew the inhabitants of low-income sectors. A program called «Remodeling your Home» was launched and the community was actively included. Existing community organizations were responsible for convening and coordinating sales promoters. Two years after the initiative was established, CC expanded to other areas of city and to other cities. Strengthening of the distribution channel with specific adjustments for the low-income populations generated a growth in demand that led to a mid-term sales projection of one million m2 of ceramic tiles per month.

To achieve this, Remodeling depended on the vertically integrated value chain of CC, but required a new distribution channel that was suitable for the expanded sales expectations in this market. The case poses three options to achieve the most appropriate distribution of the Elénica products: • The first assigns community organizations the most active role in distribution, putting them in charge of maintaining product inventory in their offices to supply demand for a zone; • The second proposal proposes that CC be the direct distributor of the product from the factory to the consumer’s home, maintaining the role of the Elénica Service Centers that the company created in neighborhoods; and • A third option creates larger service centers that function as storage warehouses near consumers.

The Centro de Gestion Hospitalaria (Hospital Management Center), a nonprofit organization created in Colombia in 1992 «to promote and lead health management transformation in order to contribute to the overall development of the sector,» registered a loss of about $91,000 in 2001.

Top management needed a strategy to put an end to operating losses and ensure its survival. To trigger alternative courses of action, the case provides information on the organization’s background, activities, and achievements in its 10 years of existence; its structure and daily operation; and its associations with several companies. Outlines the center’s main features to provide the necessary background for strategic decisions on how to tackle its operating losses and how to keep providing the training, consulting, research, and informational products needed by industry players.

Covers up to mid-2002, and discussions may close with the developments that took place when the new government took office in August of that year.